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1 Introduction
Is death bad for us?1 The question falls prey to two ambiguities, those between being
dead and dying, and between existential and universal quantification (Fletcher 2016:
145–6, 148). Here I am concerned only with dying:
Weak harm thesis: there exist lives where dying is (prudentially) bad for
the dier. (Sometimes dying is bad for us.) In symbols: ∃S∃t(n I Sot ).
(For notation see appx. A.)
Strong harm thesis: for all lives, dying is (prudentially) bad for the dier.
(Dying is always bad for us.) In symbols: ∀S∃t(n I Sot ).
In this paper I’ll argue for the weak harm thesis from a principle about which futures are
bad for a prudential subject, the future-comparison principle. A plausible strengthening
of this principle yields an argument against the strong harm thesis, and gives us reason
to doubt the ‘annihilation’ account of the badness of dying (dying is bad in that it
destroys the dier).
2 The deprivation account and the future-comparison principle
Why is dying bad for us? On the ‘comparative’ or ‘deprivation’ account (DA): Dying
(sometimes) prevents us from being the subjects of wellbeing that we would otherwise
be, and failing to be the subject of this wellbeing is bad for us (since being so would
be better for us). So sometimes dying is bad for us (cf. Fletcher 2016: 148–150; Luper
2009: ch. 5; Benatar 2017: 101–102).
The argument for the weak harm thesis from the prudential value of futures, a species
of DA, focuses on one particular life, Σ.
Σ has a linear uphill distribution, and her prudential level would continue
to rise were it not for her death (fig. 1, p. 2). Her death does not feature
any ancillary harms like pain.
Σ is of course an abstraction, but there are lives of concrete prudential subjects that
share the important features – net positive wellbeing before a death without significant
ancillary harm, and plausible net positive wellbeing after the time of (actual) death.
The following principle about wellbeing and futures is the basis of my argument.
Future-comparison principle (FCP): A sufficient condition on h being bad
for S at t is for there to exist a t-accessible future g such that S’s wellbeing
in g exceeds that in h. In symbols: nh I Sot ⇐ ∃g(tRg∧w(S)g > w(S)h).
1I talk of harming and being bad for interchangeably, and of the prudential as having to do with wellbeing.
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Figure 1: Σ’s life. Dying is bad for her.
I take it that FCP should be relatively uncontroversial; prima facie, it seems true: surely
something is bad for you if it makes you worse-off in the long run. An argument for the
weak harm principle is obtained when a characterisation of dying is given.
NF: Dying is the null future (); it is therefore of no prudential value:
∀S(w(S) = 0)
The argument comes quite easily. Let G be any deathΣ-accessible future with positive
wellbeing (such things exist by definition – see the dashed line in fig. 1). By NF, dying
() has prudential value 0. So G is accessible at deathΣ and has greater wellbeing than
. But for to be bad for Σ at deathΣ, it’s sufficient that there be better deathΣ-accessible
futures for Σ (by FCP): viz., G. So  is bad for Σ at deathΣ. (For the technical details,
see appx. B.)
Since we define I using R (the accessibility relation), it’s worth pausing for a moment
and considering what natural constraints on the accessibility relation yield for the
badness of dying.
Transitivity is a fairly natural constraint for temporal reasoning (especially if we
think of R as a ‘precedence’ relation as in tense logics), though it would require a
slight tweak of our reading of ‘accessibility’ (e.g. from ‘directly precedes’ to ‘pre-
cedes’). Consider S at t with an accessible future u, . . . , (uRu∗, . . . ,u∗···∗R). Then
tRu, tRu∗, . . . , tR, tR〈u,u∗〉, . . . , tR〈u∗,u∗∗〉, . . . , tR〈u,u∗,u∗∗〉, . . . : the t-accessibility
of any future of which any part has net positive wellbeing entails the badness of death
at t.
Reflexivity is a less natural constraint (though it makes more sense if we think of
precedence as  rather than ≺), but it yields an interesting result. Consider some
moment t at which  is accessible; by reflexivity, tRt, so we can recursively construct
an infinity of futures ; t,; t, t,; t, . . . ,. If t has net positive prudential value,  is
bad for the prudential subject at t.
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3 Objections
An influential objection to the badness of death comes from Epicurus:
Thus he is a fool who says he fears death not because it will be painful while
present but because it is painful when it is still to come. For that which
while present causes no distress causes unnecessary pain when merely
anticipated. So death, the most frightening of bad things, is nothing to us;
since when we exist, death is not yet present, and when death is present,
then we do not exist. (Epicurus 1990: 315)
Following Bradley (2004: 1), I put this ‘timing’ challenge in the form of a modus tollens
inference:
1. for any f , if f is bad for S, it is bad for her at some time
2. there is no time at which dying is bad for S
3. so dying is not bad for S
The natural response is to claim that (2) is false, since FCP is concerned with badness
at particular instants. Keeping this, and that dying is a future, in mind, it makes
perfect sense to say there are times at which dying is bad for S, since dying is a future
accessible at particular times and manifest at particular times. FCP entails that the
prudential disvalue is borne by the instant before death, since in this instant dying is an
accessible future, and the prudential value of an instant is partially determined by the
future it manifests: to be stuck between Scylla and Charybdis is bad for S even before
one of them eats her.
The classical ‘symmetry’ challenge of Lucretius (1997: 96–7 (3.972–979)) may be
addressable too.
Look back upon the ages of time past
Eternal, before we were born, and see
That they have been nothing to us, nothing at all.
This is the mirror nature holds for us
To show the face of time to come, when we
At last are dead. Is there in this for us
Anything horrible? Is there anything sad?
Is it not more free from care than any sleep?
An argument for the nonbadness of dying can be given when we formulate the ‘sym-
metry’ principle:
SP: Coming into existence (birth, the null past) and going out of existence
(dying, the null future) are alike in all relevant respects.
As there is no question of coming into existence being prudentially good or bad for us,
since there was no ‘us’, so, by SP, there is no question of going out of existence being
prudentially good or bad for us, since there will be no ‘us’. Imagine one flipped the axis
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Figure 2: Asymmetry between the past and future
of time (by ‘the mirror of nature’): birthflipped would be dyingnot flipped, as in F. Scott
Fitzgerald’s ‘The curious case of Benjamin Button’. But wouldn’t it then fail to be bad
for us? By SP the flipped and non-flipped lives are alike in all relevant respects, so
dyingnot flipped is not bad for us.2
FCP allows us to assert, and to explain, the asymmetry: At most one past is accessible
to any instant constrained by a history, so FCP does not apply to coming into existence.
Prudential asymmetry mirrors temporal asymmetry (fig. 2, p. 4).
So much for the classical worries: let’s consider an interesting objection to FCP.
Consider two accessible futures – f , which has (very high) n prudens3, and g, which
has n − ε (marginally less). Each would vastly improve S’s level of wellbeing, but on
FCP g is bad for S. But this is absurd.
The response has two parts. First, we bite the bullet: g is bad for S given the accessibility
of f . Then we show that biting the bullet is not so bad: g may be bad, but it’s not as
bad as e.g. a future with n − 35 prudens, or . Value comes, to some extent, in degrees
– the goodness/badness of a future is proportional to its prudential value. This has the
very intuitive implication that how bad dying is for S is proportional to the net value of
her other accessible future.4 It is also a natural bedfellow to FCP. (Turns out the bullet
is not so bad after all.)
As an example, take Fletcher’s (2016: 149) ‘dastardly David’ case, in which a senior
2A formulation a little closer to the poem (Lucretius seems to be concerned only with the nonbadness of
being dead) is given by Luper (2009: 61–2) (his additions in parenthesis):
1. It is not bad for us that we once failed to exist.
2. Our posthumous nonexistence is like our prevital nonexistence in all relevant respects.
3. If two things are alike in all relevant respects, and one of them is not bad for us, then the second is
not bad for us either.
4. So it is not bad for us that we will fail to exist once more.
5. (If the significant effect of a process is to place us into a state that is not bad for us, then that process
is not bad for us either.)
6. (Therefore the process of death is not bad for us.)
3A pruden is a unit of prudential value.
4Where there are more than one, some weighting is required, but this is outside of this paper’s scope.
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academic (David) prevents a brilliant junior academic (Beth) from taking up a pres-
tigious and well-funded research fellowship so she can teach a course for him. Her
wellbeing is still high – she still has a satisfying academic career, &c. – but it would’ve
been higher had she been able to take up the fellowship. It should be clear that being
prevented from taking up the fellowship is bad for Beth, even if her wellbeing is still
very high. Though it is of course not as bad for her as, e.g., dying in a bicycle accident
on her way to work.
4 Is death always bad?
So, dying is bad for some prudential subjects – but is it bad for all? Not if we accept
the strengthened future-comparison principle:
FCP+: A necessary and sufficient condition on h being bad for S at t is for
there to exist a t-accessible future g such that S’s wellbeing in g exceeds
that in h. In symbols: nh I Sot ⇔ ∃g(tRg ∧ w(S)g > w(S)h).
To see the plausibility of FCP+, consider that whenever something is bad for you, your
level of wellbeing falls relative to the best alternative. Indeed, it is bad for you only
when your level of wellbeing is lower than the best alternative.5 Thus that which is bad
is extensionally equivalent with that which lowers your level of wellbeing relative to the
alternatives, which is what FCP+ claims.
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Figure 3: Π’s life. Not dying would be bad for her.
The argument against the strong harm thesis considers Π, who is the inverse of Σ (fig.
3, p. 5). At deathΠ there are no accessible futures at which her wellbeing exceeds that
in , so by FCP+ it is not bad for her. But for that distinct future h, in which she does
not die, there exists some future, , whose prudential value exceeds that of h. To die
would not be bad for Π; to not die would be bad for Π.
5Note alternatives are given by prudential accessibility, which needn’t be constrained by nomological
possibility – or even metaphysical possibility. To evaluate alternatives, given the right theory of wellbeing,
just evaluate the counterfactual.
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It is, however, worth noting that, practically speaking, death will always feature ancillary
harms – pain, fear, projects being left unfinished. These are bad for S when S dies, but
death in itself is only sometimes bad for her.
5 The supposed badness of ceasing to be
In the foregoing, I have argued that the badness of dying is not a special type of harm,
but merely a token of comparative harm (the badness of death is not peculiar to death).
Benatar (2017: 102–110) suggests, in addition to DA, that dying is a special harm, bad
for S in that it destroys her; it makes her cease to be (the ‘annihilation’ account). I will
briefly suggest a reason to doubt this. (It is inconsistent with FCP+.)
Dying is not bad in virtue of annihilation. If one could destroy a life that would have
equal wellbeing to as it would were it not destroyed, death would be no worse for its
subject. Λ (fig. 4, p. 6) is an example, and so is ID.
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Figure 4: Λ’s life. Dying doesn’t seem to be bad for her in virtue of her ceasing to be.
Instantaneous death (ID): a subject dies, but only for an instant. She does
not remain dead, and continues to live a life of relatively high wellbeing.
Similar concrete cases have occurred, though they usually feature ancillary harms and
last longer than an instant. In ID cases it hardly seems right to say that annihilation
is bad for S since it makes the badness of death for S independent from that which is
prudentially tangible.6 What, one might ask, is so special about death?
Annihilation may not be in itself bad, as per the counterexamples7, but it is very often
associated with harms – ancillary harms, like pain; and deprivation harms of the sort
considered above: that one will cease to be entails that one will not have access to other
futures, which might be better.
6It fails to satisfy the experience requirement, for example.
7That ID is impossible given the permanence of death is not relevant – annihilation and mortal harm still
come apart conceptually (recall fn 5).
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Perhaps we can explain the annihilation intuition, then, by saying: dying entails that
one can not manifest alternative futures, and the badness of death (when it is bad)
consists in not being able to manifest better alternative futures than death. Destroying
Guernica is bad because (and insofar as) it prevents those goods that would’ve obtained
had Guernica persisted from obtaining. When death is bad, its badness is guaranteed
by annihilation, but it does not consist in annihilation.
6 Conclusion
Where does the discussion leave us? It seems the future-comparison principle (with
the null future characterisation of dying) gives us good reason to accept the weak
harm thesis on grounds of comparative harm/prudential deprivation. FCP can address
influential objections to the weak harm thesis from timing and symmetry, and seems
to address the objection regarding marginal differences in wellbeing. Further, the
strengthened future-comparison principle gives us good reason to reject the strong
harm thesis on comparative grounds, and explains why the annihilation account fails
despite the annihilation intuition not being misplaced.
And the upshot of all of this for us concrete prudential subjects? Dying is a harm when
and only when things could be in some sense better than death.
Some parenthetical remarks of a technical character to finish with: The FCP(+) frame-
work seems a useful tool for prudential analysis in general due to its enabling us to be
(i) more abstract in its almost ‘metaprudential’ character (independence of any partic-
ular theory), and (ii) more precise and explicit in its formal framework (analogous to
modal logic). It may be found helpful when applied to various other issues concerning
wellbeing, e.g. those of interpersonal wellbeing comparison and the prudential value
of the shape (structural features) of a life. FCP(+) raises its own questions, two of the
most significant of which being (i) what constraints there are on prudential accessibility
(transitive? reflexive? subset of nomological, metaphysical, &c. accessibility rela-
tion?), and (ii) whether the use of multiple prudential valuation functions, multimodal
extensions, &c. allow for richer analysis (e.g. an acceptability relation to model the
prudential correlate of obligatoriness/impermissibility).
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A Notation
• S,T, . . . are variables in domain L (prudential subjects)
• t,u, . . . are variables in domain T (instants) in the metalanguage
• f ,g, . . . are variables (in F ) standing for futures, which are chains of instants (sets
of instant-pairs) along the accessibility relation (tRu,uRv, . . .) (metalanguage)
• Σ, . . . (∈ L) and (∈ F ) are constants
• I ⊆ (F × L) – it’s read ‘(future) is bad for (prudential subject)’
• w is the prudential valuation function (to an ordered set like R), at instants and
over periods of time
• n·o· is the assignment function (at instants)
B Technical details of the argument
1. G := ιg(deathΣRG ∧ w(Σ)G > 0) (def.)
2. ∀S(w(S) = 0) (NF)
3. w(Σ) = 0 (∀-elim. 2)
4. nh I Sot ⇐ ∃g(tRg ∧ w(S)g > w(S)h) (FCP)
5. n I Sot ⇐ ∃g(tRg ∧ w(S)g > 0) (∀-elim. 4)
6. n I Σot ⇐ ∃g(tRg ∧ w(Σ)g > 0) (∀-elim. 5)
7. n I ΣodeathΣ ⇐ ∃g(deathΣRg ∧ w(Σ)g > 0) (∀-elim. 6)
8. deathΣRG ∧ w(Σ)G > 0 (G def.)
9. ∃g(deathΣRg ∧ w(Σ)g > 0) (∃-in. 8)
10. n I Σot (m.p. 7, 9)
That G denotes should be easy to see from the stipulation of Σ (fig. 1, p. 2). (5–7) are
valid instances of universal instantiation since h, S, and t are free.
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